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reviews the extent to which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has started to integrate climate 
change in its analytical and operational frameworks, showing significant shortcomings in addressing 
the risks emanating from climate change. Regional financing arrangements (RFAs) have to date not 
engaged or only very little in addressing climate-related risks. Against this backdrop, this paper 
argues that the IMF and also RFAs need to climate-proof their policies and frameworks and puts 
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climate-related financial risks in all operations; (ii) introduce consistent, systematic, and universal 
appraisal and treatment of physical climate risks and transition risks in surveillance and monitoring 
for all countries; (iii) advance disclosure of climate-related financial risks and promote sustainable 
finance and investment practices; (iv) support member countries in mainstreaming climate risk 
analysis in public financial management; (v) support climate-vulnerable countries in dealing with 
debt sustainability problems; (vi) develop lending instruments for climate emergency financing; and 
(vii) in the case of the IMF, explore options to use SDRs to support climate vulnerable countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges facing humanity. A growing body of literature 
has shown that the physical and transition impacts of climate change pose material risks to 
macrofinancial stability (e.g. NGFS 2019, Bolton et al. 2020, Semieniuk 2020) and ultimately 
sovereign risk (Volz et al. 2020a). Importantly, climate-related macrofinancial risks threaten 
not only small island development states but also larger and more advanced economies. 
Climate change should therefore be a prime concern for the institutions that form the global 
financial safety net (GFSN), including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as regional 
financing arrangements (RFAs) such as the Arab Monetary Fund, the Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralisation with its surveillance unit ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office, the 
Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development, the European Stability Mechanism, and the 
Latin American Reserve Fund.1 The IMF has only recently come to recognise that climate 
change may be a “macro-critical” factor, that is, crucial to the achievement of macroeconomic 
and financial stability, which is at the core of the Fund’s mandate. In 2015, the IMF recognised 
climate change as an “emerging structural issue”. In November 2015, then Managing Director 
Christine Lagarde acknowledged that “[t]he Fund has a role to play in helping its members 
address those challenges of climate change for which fiscal and macroeconomic policies are 
an important component of the appropriate policy response.” In October 2019, new Managing 
Director Kristalina Georgieva made clear right at the start of her tenure that she considers 
climate change a key responsibility for the IMF. Since then, she has made countless statements 
on the importance of climate change for the IMF. At the operational level, however, the Fund 
has been slow to address climate-related macrofinancial risks. Among RFAs, there has been to 
date very little or no engagement at all with climate-related risks.2 
This paper reviews the extent to which the IMF has started to integrate climate change in its 
analytical and operational frameworks and puts forward an operational agenda for the IMF as 
well as RFAs to support their membership in better managing and mitigating climate-related 
risks. The paper argues that, going forward, the IMF and RFAs should (i) mainstream systematic 
and transparent assessments of climate-related financial risks in all their operations; (ii) 
introduce consistent, systematic, and universal appraisal and treatment of physical climate 
risks and transition risks for all countries in Article IV consultations and FSAPs in the case of the 
IMF and comparable surveillance and monitoring exercises in the case of RFAs; (iii) advance 
disclosure of climate-related financial risks and promote sustainable finance and investment 
practices; (iv) support member countries in mainstreaming climate risk analysis in public 
financial management; (v) support climate-vulnerable countries in dealing with debt 
                                                        
1 The global financial safety net also comprises bilateral or multilateral central bank swap arrangements. See, for 
instance, McKay et al. (2011). 
2 The Arab Monetary Fund published “General Guidelines for Central Banks to Deal with the Implications of 
Natural Disasters and Climate Changes on Banking System and Financial Stability” in June 2020 (AMF 2020). The 
AMRO dedicated three pages of its ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook to climate change in April 2020 (AMRO 
2020). 
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sustainability problems; (vi) develop lending instruments for climate emergency financing; and 
(vii) in the case of the IMF, explore options to use SDRs to support climate vulnerable countries. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews how the IMF has so far addressed climate-
related risks in its analytical and operational work. Section 3 discusses options for the IMF as 
well as RFAs to incorporate climate risks into their operational frameworks and thereby 
climate-proof the GFSN. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The IMF and climate change 
“At the IMF we recognize that the climate actions we take in our institution and globally are 
paramount for our future. We have embraced climate in everything we do.” – Kristalina 
Georgieva, December 2020 
The IMF recognised climate change as an emerging structural issue in 2015 (Bretton Woods 
Project 2019). In November 2015, Christine Lagarde, the IMF’s Managing Director at the time, 
acknowledged that “[t]he Fund has a role to play in helping its members address those 
challenges of climate change for which fiscal and macroeconomic policies are an important 
component of the appropriate policy response” (Lagarde 2015: 1). Lagarde asserted that, while 
the Fund is “is not an environmental organization […] climate change poses significant risks for 
macroeconomic performance and several of the appropriate policy responses lie within the 
Fund’s expertise” (ibid.). Lagarde identified six roles that the Fund should play: (i) analytical 
work; (ii) technical assistance, surveillance and training; (iii) promoting dialogue, (iv) integrating 
natural disaster risks and preparedness strategies in macroeconomic forecasts and debt 
sustainability analyses; (v) helping countries incorporate adaptation strategies in medium-term 
budget frameworks; and (vi) working closely with other institutions to encourage consistent 
climate-related disclosures, prudential requirements, and stress testing for the financial sector 
(Table 1).3 
 
Table 1. The IMF’s role in addressing climate change according to Christine Lagarde, 2015 
Analytical work underpins the 
Fund’s contributions 
The IMF draws on the specialist analysis of others contributing within their 
mandates (e.g., the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the 
International Energy Agency, the World Bank) and focuses on the practical 
design and administration of fiscal instruments for climate policy and 
broader energy policy. For example, Fund staff work has quantified, for 
over 160 countries, the environmental, fiscal, and economic benefits of 
energy pricing reform, including the removal of subsidies. This information 
helps policymakers craft the specifics of legislation to meet environmental 
and fiscal objectives and enlightens stakeholders on the case for reform. An 
overarching issue, which staff intends to analyze, is the growth impact of 
transitioning to a less carbon-intensive economy. 
                                                        
3 Lagarde’s piece draws from an IMF Staff Discussion Note by Farid et al. (2016). 
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Technical assistance, 
surveillance and training 
The Fund is well positioned to provide technical assistance and training, 
given its global membership and expertise in fuel tax design, tax 
administration, and energy price reform. Climate and energy policy 
developments are sometimes discussed in Article IV consultations, and this 
seems likely to become increasingly common. Next steps on further 
integration in surveillance will be informed by assessing experience with 
selected pilot countries. 
Promoting dialogue The Fund collaborates with other international organizations (e.g., World 
Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and 
United Nations Environment Programme) to promote policy dialogue 
among finance ministries, emphasizing the benefits of carbon pricing as one 
component of an effective tax structure. 
Integrating natural disaster 
risks and preparedness 
strategies in macroeconomic 
forecasts and debt 
sustainability analyses 
Low-income and small developing states are especially vulnerable to 
increasing risks of extreme weather events. Staff, collaborating with other 
international institutions, will work with countries to develop 
comprehensive risk management frameworks to assess risks and determine 
the right mix of building domestic buffers versus risk transfer through 
insurance or financial market instruments, while tailoring investment and 
growth policies to building resilience. 
Help countries incorporate 
adaptation strategies in 
medium-term budget 
frameworks 
More analysis of the macroeconomic implications of adaptation policies is 
needed. Where macro-critical, the fiscal costs of adaptation, and the 
effective use of climate- related financial flows, will need to be integrated in 
sustainable medium-term fiscal frameworks. 
Work closely with other 
institutions to encourage 
consistent climate-related 
disclosures, prudential 
requirements, and stress 
testing for the financial sector 
Staff work, in close coordination with other institutions, such as the World 
Bank. Financial Stability Board and International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIA) will: i) enhance understanding of the transmission 
mechanisms from climate risks to financial stability, ii) contribute to the 
design of appropriate disclosure rules for climate risk exposure, iii) provide 
technical assistance to promote safe and sound development of markets 
and instruments to help manage climate-related risks, iv) contribute to the 
development of best practices for stress-testing for climate risks, and v) 
support ongoing work on globally consistent prudential requirements for 
the insurance sector, including on a Global Insurance Capital Standard being 
developed by IAIS to allow for catastrophe risk in capital requirements. 
Source: Lagarde (2015). 
 
Although the IMF was rather slow to follow up on this agenda set out by Lagarde, there has 
been a steady increase in the number of publications and events with substantial reference to 
climate change since 2016 (Figure 1). The most notable outputs include a chapter on weather 
shocks on economic activity in low-income countries in the 2017 World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) report (IMF 2017), volumes on ‘Resilience and Growth in the Small States of the Pacific’ 
(Khor et al. 2016) and ‘Unleashing Growth and Strengthening Resilience in the Caribbean’ 
(Alleyne et al. 2017), and a policy paper on ‘Small States’ Resilience to Natural Disasters and 
Climate Change – Role for the IMF’ (IMF 2016). Still, only relatively few people at the IMF 
regarded climate change as a “macro-critical” factor, i.e., crucial to the achievement of 
macroeconomic and financial stability, which is at the core of the Fund’s mandate. 
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Figure 1. Number of publications and events with substantial reference to climate change, 
January 2000 – October 2020 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
Note: Publications which show at least ten references to ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, ‘climate risk’ and/or 
‘climate-related’ or provide at least one whole paragraph, box or section on the topic are categorised as 
having “substantial reference” to climate change. 
 
The IMF’s attention to climate change increased markedly in 2019. That year, IMF staff 
produced a growing number of working papers and reports addressing important dimensions 
of climate change, including the fiscal challenges of and responses to climate change (IMF 
2019a, 2019b) and sustainable finance and environmental, social and governance reporting 
(IMF 2019c). The IMF also published a review of macroeconomic and financial policies for 
mitigating climate change (Krogstrup and Oman 2019). On top of this, the IMF became an 
observer of the Central Banks and Financial Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial 
System (NGFS), a group of 75 central banks and supervisory authorities (and 13 observers) 
committed to better understand and manage the financial risks and opportunities stemming 
from climate change.4 
Upon taking up her role in October 2019, the new Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva 
made clear that she considers climate change a key responsibility for the IMF. At the 2019 
Annual Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank Group in October, Georgieva acknowledged 
the centrality of climate risks for the Fund’s work: “The criticality of addressing climate change 
for financial stability, for making sure that we can have sustainable growth, is so very clear and 
proven today, that no institution, no individual can step from the responsibility to act. For the 
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IMF, we always look at risks. And this is now a category of risk that absolutely has to be front 
and centre in our work” (IMF 2019d). 
However, in its operational work – comprising surveillance, technical assistance and training, 
and emergency lending and crisis support – the IMF has been rather slow to address climate-
related financial risks. In its surveillance and monitoring operations, which are carried out at 
the global, regional and country levels, the IMF seeks to identify potential risks to 
macroeconomic and financial stability and puts forward policy adjustments that should 
support economic growth, promote financial and economic stability, and prevent the build-up 
of financial risks. At the country level, surveillance centres around the annual Article IV 
consultations. As can be seen in Figure 2, the IMF has only recently started to address climate 
change in some of its Article IV consultations with its member countries. Since the early 2010s, 
when climate change was still virtually absent from Article IV consultations, a small number of 
Article IV reports per year included substantial references to climate change. A large increase 
was recorded in 2019.5 However, in the vast majority of Article IV consultations, climate change 
and climate-related macroeconomic and fiscal risks still play no role. 
 
Figure 2. Number of Article IV reports with reference to climate change, January 2000 – 
October 2020 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
Note: Included are all the published staff reports of Article IV consultations that took place between January 
2000 and June 2020 that include the words ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, ‘climate-related’ or ‘climate risk’. 
Article IV reports which show at least ten references to ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, ‘climate risk’ and/or 
‘climate-related’ or provide at least one whole paragraph, box or section on the topic are categorised as 
making “substantial reference” to climate change. All others are categorised as making “some reference” to 
                                                        
5 A few country studies on climate-related risks were conducted outside of Article IV consultations, including an 
analysis of enhancing resilience to natural disasters in St. Lucia (Cantelmo et al. 2019) and an analysis of transition 
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climate change. The year refers to the year in which the consultation was held, not the year of publication as 
a staff report. 
 
A survey of the IMF’s most recent Article IV reports (for 2019) for five countries with ongoing 
coal sector expansions (India, Indonesia, Mozambique, the Philippines, and South Africa) 
showed that the IMF’s analysis did not sufficiently recognise climate-related macroeconomic 
risks (Mainhardt 2020). For India, Indonesia, and South Africa, climate change was not 
considered a macroeconomic risk in these Article IV reports. For Mozambique and the 
Philippines, climate change was deemed a macroeconomic risk, but only stemming from 
physical impacts of climate change. Transition risks were not considered at all in these reports. 
Moreover, Mainhardt (2020) highlights that the Article IV reports for India, Indonesia, and 
Mozambique were supportive of tax incentives for fossil-fuel related infrastructure 
investments, even though new investments in coal and other fossil fuels enhance stranded 
asset and transition risks for the economy. 
At the country level, the IMF conducts two surveillance activities jointly with the World Bank: 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and Debt Sustainability Analyses for low-income 
countries. To date, climate change has played no or little role in the Financial Sector 
Assessment Programs, and where it does, it is covered in the parts produced by the World 
Bank. Likewise, the joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Analyses for low-income 
countries, which are structured examinations of developing country debt based on the Debt 
Sustainability Framework, do not systematically address climate risk analysis for the time 
being. An exemption was the latest Debt Sustainability Analysis that was carried out for Somalia 
as part of the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in 2020, which did include 
a simulation of a climate shock scenario (IMF 2020a). 
At the regional level, the IMF has organised a number or regional dialogues for Pacific islands 
and the Caribbean.6 Among the flagship publications for regional surveillance, the Regional 
Economic Outlooks (REO), to date only the 2020 REO for Sub-Saharan Africa had a special 
chapter dedicated to ‘Adapting to Climate Change in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (IMF 2020b). 
The IMF’s global surveillance has to date not systematically addressed climate-related 
macrofinancial risks in a major report or integrated this issue in its regular monitoring 
exercises. The IMF published the already-mentioned chapter on the impact of weather shocks 
on economic activity in low-income countries in the 2017 WEO report (IMF 2017), a chapter 
on sustainable finance in the 2019 Global Financial Stability Report (IMF 2019c) and an analysis 
of mitigating climate change in the 2019 Fiscal Monitor, which focused on carbon pricing (IMF 
2019b). During the COVID-19 crisis, the Fund adopted a strong rhetoric calling for a green 
                                                        
6 These included a High-Level Dialogue on ‘Enhancing Macroeconomic Resilience to Natural Disasters in the Pacific 
Islands’ in 2015, a workshop and High-Level Pacific Islands Dialogue on ‘Building Resilience to Natural Disasters 
and Climate Change’ in 2017, and a High-Level Conference on ‘Building Resilience to Disasters and Climate Change 
in the Caribbean’ in 2018. 
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recovery and “building back better”.7 This was backed up by numerous analytical pieces on the 
need to tackle climate risks and boost resilience. This included a chapter on “Mitigating Climate 
Change” in the October 2020 WEO (IMF 2020c). 
With respect to technical assistance, the IMF – together with the World Bank – has thus far 
conducted so-called Climate Change Policy Assessments for six countries: the Seychelles (June 
2017), St. Lucia (June 2018), Belize (November 2018), Grenada (July 2019), the Federated 
States of Micronesia (September 2019), and Tonga (June 2020). Climate Change Policy 
Assessments provide “an overarching assessment of countries’ climate strategies—as 
articulated in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and other government 
documents” and “are intended to help countries build coherent macro-frameworks for 
responding to climate change, which could improve prospects for attracting external finance 
and put future revisions to NDCs on a sound footing” (IMF 2020e). 
Regarding the IMF’s third main area of work, supporting member countries facing balance of 
payments difficulties and providing temporary financing, the IMF has a Rapid Credit Facility 
(RCF) and a Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) which can be each used in catastrophe situations 
including climate disasters. The RCF “provides rapid concessional financial assistance with 
limited conditionality to low-income countries (LICs) facing an urgent balance of payments 
need” (IMF 2020f). The RCF’s concessional financial support is provided exclusively to LICs 
through the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). Member countries that are not PRGT-
eligible can access the RFI (IMF 2020g).8 However, while both the RCF and RFI provide quick 
access to finance, they are both quota-based and provide only small emergency support. The 
IMF has not yet had a meaningful discussion about adjusting these facilities or create a new 
facility that would be tailored to support members in responding to shocks related to climate 
change. 
The IMF toolkit also comprises the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT), which 
enables the Fund “to provide grants for debt relief for the poorest and most vulnerable 
countries hit by catastrophic natural disasters or public health disasters” (IMF 2020h). 
However, for the time being only 33 countries are eligible for support from the CCRT (IMF 
2020i). For the majority of member countries, including climate vulnerable developing 
countries, the IMF has no specific frameworks or instruments to deal with climate-related debt. 
Overall, despite growing research evidence and financial supervisors’ awareness of the 
materiality of climate-related financial risks, climate risk considerations have thus far been 
largely excluded from the IMF’s policies. The IMF’s own publications have established that 
“climate change is potentially macro-critical” (IMF 2019a), but also reveal that staff in many 
cases apparently don’t consider climate change to be macro-critical. Often, climate risks are 
not examined at all. 
                                                        
7 See, for instance the September 2020 issue of the IMF’s Finance and Development magazine on resilience (IMF 
2020d). 
8 The RFI replaced the Emergency Natural Disaster Assistance and Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance facilities. 
 9 
The Fund has announced to scale up climate-related surveillance, addressing both physical 
risks posed by the increasing severity of climate impacts, and transition risks posed by a change 
in the value of fossil-fuel assets. However, the Fund has also indicated that surveillance on 
climate issues will not be mandatory in Article IV consultations, raising the prospect of climate 
risk being evaluated from some countries, but not others. 
 
3. Climate-proofing the global financial safety net 
For mainstreaming climate-related macroeconomic and financial risks assessments in its 
operations, the IMF and also RFAs need to recognise that climate risks differ from the types of 
risks that are considered in traditional financial risk analyses. While traditional financial risk 
evaluation and benchmarks are based on historical performances and thus backward-looking, 
climate risks are forward-looking in nature and characterised by deep uncertainty, non-
linearity and endogeneity. Moreover, climate risks could be amplified by the complexity of the 
financial system (Battiston and Monasterolo 2019). Ignoring forward-looking climate risks in 
policy design and implementation omits a major source of macroeconomic and financial 
stability. Thus, assessing countries’ exposures to climate-related macrofinancial risks should be 
at the core of the IMF’s work and also of that of RFAs that conduct surveillance. The macro 
models currently used by the IMF and other international organisations are not designed to 
consider climate risks and need to be enhanced to identify the largest sources of 
macroeconomic and fiscal risks and assess the exposures of the private and public sectors to 
forward-looking climate-related risks. Enriching the analytical frameworks for assessing 
climate-related risks provides the basis for designing tailored measures to mitigate such risks, 
while addressing potential trade-offs on sustainable development and inequality. 
Going forward, the IMF and also RFAs should make concerted efforts to support their member 
countries in mitigating and managing climate-related physical and transition risks and also 
provide assistance in measures aimed at scaling up investment in resilience. The following 
measures would help to climate-proof the operations of the IMF and – where applicable – also 
of RFAs: 
i. mainstream systematic and transparent assessments of climate-related financial risks 
in all operations; 
ii. introduce consistent, systematic, and universal appraisal and treatment of physical 
climate risks and transition risks in surveillance and monitoring for all countries; 
iii. advance disclosure of climate-related financial risks and promote sustainable finance 
and investment practices; 
iv. support member countries in mainstreaming climate risk analysis in public financial 
management; 
v. support climate-vulnerable countries in dealing with debt sustainability problems; 
vi. develop lending instruments for climate emergency financing; and  
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vii. in the case of the IMF, explore options to use SDRs to support climate vulnerable 
countries. 
(i) Mainstreaming systematic and transparent assessments of climate-related financial risks in 
all operations 
The starting point for the IMF and RFAs is to mainstream a transparent assessment of climate-
related financial risks in their operations. As the availability of science-based climate financial 
risk metrics and methods such as climate stress-testing and climate-financial pricing models 
increases, the IMF and RFAs have a solid ground for incorporating assessments of climate-
related financial risks into their macroeconomic modelling, in order to better inform its policy 
advices and thus to be able to deliver on its mandate. Given the role of the financial sector in 
the economy and society, the assessment of climate-related financial risks (and opportunities) 
should be integrated in a transparent way. 
(ii) Introducing consistent, systematic, and universal appraisal and treatment of physical 
climate risks and transition risks in surveillance and monitoring for all countries 
Second, by including a mandatory section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all 
member countries, the IMF can mainstream the assessment of climate risks in countries’ 
financial stability analyses. A consistent, systematic, and universal treatment of climate risks in 
Article IV consultations will facilitate better management and mitigation of macrofinancial risks 
through governments and enhance the recognition of such risks by the financial sector. 
Importantly, a systematic analysis of climate-related macrofinancial risks should not be limited 
to a few countries deemed highly vulnerable to the physical impacts of climate change. 
Scenario-based assessment of all sources of vulnerability for the macroeconomy, the financial 
system, and public finances is needed for all member countries, addressing both physical and 
transition risks (Bos and Gupta 2019, Volz et al. 2020a). 
The IMF could also include a mandatory section on climate-related financial risks to the 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs it conducts together with the World Bank. Crucially, the 
IMF should recognise the unique susceptibilities of climate vulnerable countries, stemming 
from both physical and transition risks, and support their financial and monetary authorities in 
developing capacities to better assess and respond to climate risks, e.g. via climate stress-
testing to inform the design of prudential policies, when needed. 
A better analysis of climate-related macrofinancial risks will not only enable better micro- and 
macroprudential policies to safeguard macrofinancial stability, it should also lead to better 
pricing of these risks by financial markets, which will contribute to overcoming barriers to 
scaling-up sustainable investment (Monasterolo and Volz 2020). 
(iii) Advancing disclosure of climate-related financial risks and promoting sustainable finance 
and investment practices 
To meet the commitment of “making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development” made in Article 2.1c 
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commitment of the Paris Agreement, it will be crucial to mainstream sustainability practices in 
financial decision making. Well-developed financial markets that account for sustainability risks 
facilitate climate-friendly private sector investment. The IMF’s 2019 Global Financial Stability 
Report highlights the way investors and equity markets have long ignored the growing risk of 
financial losses associated with climate risk (IMF 2019c). The IMF could use its unique position 
in international finance to promote the disclosure of climate-related financial risks and the 
development of sustainable finance and investment practices. As an observer of the NGFS, the 
IMF can play an important role in working with monetary and financial authorities and 
international organisations like the Bank for International Settlements in acceleration the 
adoption of sustainable finance policies and practices that will be crucial for both climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. Likewise, RFAs could work with their member constituents 
to strengthen sustainable finance policies and practices. 
(iv) Supporting member countries in mainstreaming climate risk analysis in public financial 
management 
Fourth, the IMF (and RFAs to the extent that they engage in capacity building) could provide 
support to member countries in strengthening public debt management to enable them to 
better account for climate risks in public budgets. Importantly, governments should be 
supported in developing contingency plans and securing pre-arranged contingent financing 
facilities from different sources, as well as insurance-based solutions. 
Through policy advice and technical assistance, the IMF and RFAs can support climate 
vulnerable countries in climate-proofing public finances. In particular, they can encourage and 
provide advice to finance ministries on how to analyse the potential impacts of climate change 
on the medium- to long-term quality and sustainability of public finances and mainstream 
climate risk analysis in public financial management. Based on climate vulnerability 
assessments, the IMF and RFAs can help finance ministries identify potential risks on the 
expenditure and revenue side (Volz et al. 2020a). The IMF and RFAs could also support member 
countries in incorporating fiscal buffers for climate-related risks in budget planning. In 
particular, they could help promote budgetary instruments for ex ante disaster financing, 
including contingency lines and disaster, reserve, or contingency savings funds (Cevik and 
Huang 2018). 
Since debt sustainability can be affected by a country’s ability to absorb shocks, it is important 
that governments of climate vulnerable countries are supported in developing contingency 
plans including options for securing pre-arranged and pre-agreed pricing of risk transfer 
instruments. To enhance debt sustainability, the IMF and RFAs could promote a discussion 
around adding natural disaster clauses to sovereign debt contracts and the use of instruments 
such as GDP-linked bonds. Moreover, they could seek to enhance transparency of public debt 
contracts, and support governments in asserting that assumptions and terms or clauses of debt 
contracts are realistic and sustainable. 
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By supporting climate vulnerable countries in strengthening public debt management and 
engaging with initiatives like the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, the IMF and 
also RFAs can contribute to enhanced debt sustainability and enable a better accounting for 
climate risks and investment opportunities that deliver high socio-economic and adaptation 
dividends in public budgets. 
(v) Supporting climate-vulnerable countries in dealing with debt sustainability problems 
Fifth, the IMF could play an important role in supporting climate vulnerable countries that are 
facing debt sustainability challenges or are already in debt distress. As recently highlighted by 
Georgieva et al. (2020), a “reform of the international debt architecture is urgently needed”. 
The IMF (2020j) has recently put forward reform options for the international architecture for 
resolving sovereign debt involving private-sector creditors. At a general level, the IMF could 
explore options for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, as was originally proposed by 
the IMF two decades ago (IMF 2003), to deal with debt crises.  
Beyond this, the IMF ought to make sure that climate risks are sufficiently integrated in debt 
analysis and policy frameworks for resolving debt crises. As discussed, the joint World Bank-
IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries does currently not consider 
climate-related risks for public finances in a systematic way, and in the majority of cases not at 
all. It also ignores investment needs in climate adaptation to reduce climate vulnerability, 
which is having adverse effects on the sovereign cost of capital and can amplifies sovereign risk 
(Buhr et al. 2018, Volz et al. 2020a). The Debt Sustainability Framework therefore needs to be 
enhanced to incorporate the impact of climate-related risks on debt sustainability. This is a 
crucial step for identifying debt vulnerabilities early on so that debt problems can be addressed 
and delays in debt restructuring, if needed, be avoided. Importantly, assessment should also 
be rolled out to climate vulnerable middle-income countries. 
In the context of the current COVID-19 crisis, which has worsened public finances in the Global 
South, many low-income and middle-income countries will require debt relief to respond 
effectively to the crisis and undertake meaningful investment to climate-proof their 
economies. The IMF will have to play a crucial role in assessing debt sustainability and making 
sure that debt restructuring, where needed, provides the fiscal space for governments to 
invest in green and inclusive recoveries that also strengthen climate resilience (Volz et al. 
2020b). 
Going forward, the IMF should also explore options for the treatment of climate debt, i.e. 
public debt that has been incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or necessary 
adaptation measures (Volz 2020). This is particularly relevant for Small Island Developing 
States, where single events can have devastating effects on the economy and public finances. 
(vi) Developing lending instruments for climate emergency financing 
Sixth, the IMF and RFAs could explore to what extent their existing emergency financing 
facilities should be further developed or new climate emergency financing facilities should be 
developed. This is particularly relevant for Small Island Developing States though options 
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should be explored as well to include other climate vulnerable countries. For the IMF, one 
option is to raise access under the RCF/RFI, e.g. up to 400-500 percent of quota. Moreover, 
options should be explored to converting these facilities into grants, particularly for PRGT-
eligible countries. A further option would be to establish an entirely new climate disaster 
emergency facility. The IMF could also explore to link a climate disaster facility to an issuance 
of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which would benefit only countries hit by climate disasters. 
(vii) In the case of the IMF, exploring options to use SDRs to support climate vulnerable countries 
Seventh, the IMF and its membership should consider the possibility of allocating new SDRs as 
a way of providing vulnerable countries with enhanced liquidity. While a general SDR allocation 
would primarily benefit large economies, options could be explored where rich countries, 
whose historic carbon emissions are the main cause of anthropogenic climate change, make 
their SDRs available to a new multilateral swap facility or donate their SDRs to a trust fund at 
the IMF, which could use them in a way that benefits climate vulnerable countries. Another 
option would be to develop a mechanism where new SDRs are issued exclusively to climate 
vulnerable countries. Such an SDR issuance could be linked to exogenous shocks such as 
climate-induced disasters, eliminating problems with moral hazard. As climate vulnerable 
countries that have hardly contributed to global climate change suffer the biggest impacts, SDR 
issuances for climate vulnerable countries could be a way of enhancing resilience and global 
climate justice at the same time. 
 
The role that RFAs can and should assume depends on their mandates and resource capacities, 
but also the context in which they are operating. For instance, the European Stability 
Mechanism could make important contributions to analysing macrofinancial risks arising from 
climate change for countries of the European Union, but it may have a lesser role in providing 
emergency finance given alternative funding sources through the European Commission. On 
the other hand, the Arab Monetary Fund, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation and 
AMRO, the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development, and the Latin American Reserve 
Fund have in their membership countries facing large physical and/or transition risk with 
limited options for obtaining external crisis financing should they need it. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The macrofinancial risks arising from climate change pose a serious threat to economic 
development. The macrofinancial impacts of climate change can trigger balance-of-payments 
or financial crisis. For the time being, the institutions that form the GFSN are not equipped to 
properly analyse these risks, nor do they have the policy frameworks or lending instruments to 
mitigate or manage climate-related crises. Since 2015, when the IMF identified climate change 
as an “emerging structural issue”, the Fund has come a long way in acknowledging the 
macrocriticality of climate change. Yet, at the operational level, the IMF has been too slow in 
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address climate-related macrofinancial risks. Among RFAs, there has been almost no 
engagement with climate-related risks thus far. 
Against this backdrop, this paper argues that the IMF and also RFAs need to climate-proof their 
policies and frameworks and puts forward seven recommendations, calling on the IMF and 
RFAs to (i) mainstream systematic and transparent assessments of climate-related financial 
risks in all their operations; (ii) introduce consistent, systematic, and universal appraisal and 
treatment of physical climate risks and transition risks in surveillance and monitoring for all 
countries; (iii) advance disclosure of climate-related financial risks and promote sustainable 
finance and investment practices; (iv) support member countries in mainstreaming climate risk 
analysis in public financial management; (v) support climate-vulnerable countries in dealing 
with debt sustainability problems; (vi) develop lending instruments for climate emergency 
financing; and (vii) in the case of the IMF, explore options to use SDRs to support climate 
vulnerable countries. 
The omission of climate-related risks is a glaring hole in the GFSN. Climate proofing the GFSN 
is not only a matter of safeguarding national, regional or even global financial stability. It is also 
a matter of climate justice, as poorer countries are disproportionally affected by the 
consequences of global warming. It is therefore imperative that the IMF rapidly strengthens it 
analytical capacity and develops its policy frameworks to adequately help its membership in 
mitigating and managing climate-related macrofinancial risks. RFAs can complement this, 
according to their mandates and capacities. A climate-proofing of the GFSN needs to be 
supplemented by more ambitious global climate policies, in which multilateral development 
banks and development finance institutions ought to play substantial roles in supporting 
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